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I!J THE SUPRE:·lE COUHT OF TllE STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: ROBERT l3. HANSEl-J 
No. 15605 
Disciplinary Proceeding 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Robert B. Hansen, Appellant, was charged in a complaint 
before the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar with 
four counts of unprofessional conduct, each count relating to 
legal work done by him for a particular client. 
DISPOSITION BY THE 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
After a two-day hearing, the Hearing Examiners entered coo-
clusionary type findings to the effect that Appellant had, as 
to three of the four counts, violated specified canons of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. On the Fourth Count, dealing 
with legal work done for one James Dick and one John R. Dick, 
the conclusionary findings entered by the Hearing Examiners 
are negative in tone, but the Examiners concluded that the acts 
noted in their findings did not violate the Rules of Professior: 
Conduct, nor the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The recommen-
dation made by the Hearing Examiners was that Appellant be 
suspended for one year, and that the Board of Bar Comr.1issioner' 
adopt and approve the recommendations and forward the finding:; 
and the recommendation to the Utah Suµreme Court. 
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The Board of Bar Commissioners entered an order dated 
January 6, 1978, adopting the findings of the Hearing Examiners 
and recommending to the Supreme Court that Appellant be sus-
pended from the practice of law for a period of one year. 1 
1. We believe that it is important to note at this point that 
the Board of Bar Commissioners did not have a transcript of 
the evidence available to it. Its order was entered January 
6th, and the court reporter completed and certified the trans-
cript on January 18, 1978. The recommendation of the Bar 
Commissioners, which is an essential step in this disciplinary 
proceeding, was thus based entirely on the conclusionary find-
ings of the Hearing Examiners. These findings are devoid of 
any of the specifics. Even if the Board of Bar Commissioners 
was willing, without knowing any of the details or specifics, 
to accept the conclusion that the Appellant was guilty of 
unprofessional conduct, the Board, nevertheless, surely needed 
to know the details before it could determine whether the 
recommended one-year suspension was appropriate. It did not 
have these details, because the transcript of the evidence was 
not available, and the findings of the Hearing Examiners are 
mere conclusionary statements and are not even useful in 
determining the details and circumstances of the claimed 
violations. 
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THE Nf\'l'URE OF 'l'l!E RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant, by this proceeding, urges the court to set as~ 
some of the negative findings on the grounds that they do not 
fairly reflect the evidence, and that the court note the miti-
gating circumstances which are shown by the evidence, but 
ignored in the findings. We urge the court to reject the 
recommendation for a one-year suspension. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ARGUMENT 
We believe that we can most effectively present this 
matter by (a) noting, as to each of the four counts, the speci-
fic allegations of the complaint; (b) setting forth the parti-
cular canons of Professional Conduct referred to in the com-
plaint; (c) referring to the applicable findings; (d) detail-
ing the evidence and noting wherein we believe the findings 
are either contrary to or do not fairly reflect the evidence; 
and (e) arguing the facts. 
We object to the findings in three basic particulars. 
First, because of the conclusionary form of the findings the 
Hearing Examiners really didn't deal with several specific 
evidentiary disputes. Second, there are no findings at all 
concerning mitigating circumstances. Third, we submit that so~: 
of the findings really do not accurately or fairly reflect the 
evidence. With this explanation as to the manner in which we 
propose to proceed, we turn to the specific counts of the 
complaint, which we have elected to discuss in inverse order. 
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POINT I. COUNT IV OF COMPLAINT: THE LEGAL 
WORK PERFORMED FOR JOHN R. DICK 
AND Jfu\\E:S DICK. THE FINDINGS ARE 
CONTRARY TO THE TESTIMONY AND THE 
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN CRITICAL 
ASPECTS, DO NOT ADDRESS THE FACTUAL 
ALLEGATI01'S, AHE UNFAIR OVERALL AND ItWICATE 
A GENERAL LACK OF CAREFUL ATTENTION THAT 
SHOULD BE GIVEN FHlDINGS IN A DISCIPLit<ARY 
PROCEEDING. 
(a). The Charge. The complaint charges that Appellant 
undertook to represent John R. Dick and James Dick in the pur-
chase of real property from American National Mortgage Co. It 
asserts in paragraph 1 that l\merican National did not hold title, 
and that this was a fact which Appellant did not ascertain. 
Paragraph 2 alleges that title to the property being sold was 
held by a third party named Soelberg. It next alleges that 
subsequent litigation instituted by Appellant in the names of 
John R. and James Dick resulted in American National obtaining 
a "judgment" on its "counterclaim" against John R. Dick in 
the sum of $1,341.65. Paragraph 4 then alleges that the Dicks 
assert that they did not have knowledge of, did not consent 
to or in any way authorize Appellant to institute the litiga-
tion in their names; that they were unaware of the judgment 
until a subsequent title report revealed it, and that the judg-
ment constituted a lien on the real property owned by the Dicks. 
Paragraph 6 asserts that Appellant was the real party in interest 
in the litigation. It is then charged that his conduct vio-
lated Rule IV, Canon 1, DR 1-102 (4), (5), (6), and Canon 5, 
DR 5-103 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State 
Bar, and the provisions of Rule 17(a) and Rule 11 of the URCP. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
(bl 'l'he Canons. For the convenience of the court we next 
set forth the rules of conduct referred to in this charqe. n 
are as follows: 
Rule IV Canon 1, DR 1-102 Misconduct. 
(A) A lawyer shall not: 
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation. 
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely 
reflects on his fitness to practice law. 
Rule IV Canon 5, DR 5-103 Avoiding Acquisition of 
Interest in Litigation 
(A) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest 
in the cause of action or subject matter of litiga-
tion he is conducting for a client, except that he 
may: 
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee 
or expenses. 
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contin-
gent fee in a civil case. 
(B) While representing a client in connection with con-
templating or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not 
advance or guarantee financial assistance to his 
client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee 
the expenses of litigation, including court costs, 
expenses of investigation, expenses of medical exam-
ination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evi-
dence, provided the client remains ultimately lia~le 
for such expenses. 
Rule 17 (a) requires an action to be brought in the name o; 
the real party in interest, and Rule 11 requires the attorney 
to sign the pleadings, and states that the signature of an 
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read tile 
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pleading; that there is "good ground'' to support it, etc. 
(c) The Findings and Decision. The Hearing Examiners con-
cluded that the conduct of Appellant in representing John and 
James Dick did not violate either the specified Canons nor the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which are cited, yet in Finding 
No. 7 they made a series of findings which are negative in 
tone, and are not consistent with the evidence. Further, the 
findings really don't address the charges made in the complaint, 
nor the specific evidence offerred. We submit that on this 
count Appellant is entitled to be exonerated and to have ex-
press findings that he did not commit the wrongs with which he 
was charged. We thus turn to the evidence. 
(d) The Evidence. The opening statement on the Dick matter 
made by Mr. Stark, representing the Utah State Bar, follows the 
complaint (R. 12-15). There is no serious conflict in the test-
imony of Appellant on the one hand and John R. and James Dick 
on the other. Neither John R. Dick nor James Dick appeared 
personally, but it was stipulated (R.223) that the testimony 
each gave in his deposition could be used. 
The uncontradicted evidence shows that Appellant did under-
take to represent the Dicks in the purchase of certain real 
property (R.225,351, John Dick Dep. 9,10, James Dick Dep. 5). 
The first assertion made in the complaint and in the opening 
statement by Mr. Sta~ was that Appellant did not ascertain the 
outstanding interest of Mr. Soelberg. On this they are simply 
wrong. Appellant testified (R.434) that he had a title report, 
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contract itself, wherein the Dicks were the p~rchciscrs, and 
American Nationol Mortgage Co. · .. 1as ti1e seller, ,,;cis i:-itroducec 
in evidence as Ex. 49. Paragrci;)h 6 of that contract expressl~· 
states: 
"It is understood that there prL'scntly exists a~ 
obligation against said property in fa~or of Le~o~ 
Soelberg, Sr. and Jean E. Soelbcrg, with an unpaid 
balance of $3,600 as of i>1y lS, 1965." 
Further, John R. Dick testified thal AppL'llant told then that 
Soelbergs had an interest (Dep. p.10). John Dick \,•as asked i" 
i1e kne .. : Mr. Soelberg \·:as the seller of the property to .h..-:-.eric2: 
National Mortgage, and he testified: "I think it so stipulatec 
here. \~e knc· ... · that he had some interest", and he explained tho 
Appellant had so advised them (Dep. p.10). Thus, the charge i: 
the complaint and Finding 7(b) that Appellant did not ascerta:. 
the identity of the fee owner is simply wrong and contrary to 
the undisputed evidence. The finding criticizes the Appellant 
where no criticism is warranted. 
The Appellant did not ascertain that the Dicks ~ere only 
paying $600 a year (Ex. 49), whereas American National l-iortc;aqe 
was obligated to pay Soelberg $1,000 per year (R.373). This 
was noted by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Dick v 
American National Mortgage Co., 29 Ut.2d 404, 510 P.2d 1906 
(1973). There this court noted that the Dicks had agreed to 
pay $5,700 for the property, and that after the do~n payme~t 
they were to pay $SO per month. The court notcJ lhc.? o\JlicFl~' 
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in the amount of $3,600 owed to Soelberg noted in paragraph 6 
of the real estate contract prepared by Appellant (Ex.49). 
American i-Ja ti on al had not paid Soelberg, and was in its allowed 
grace period. Appellant brought suit, because American National 
had not paid, and the majority of the Utah Supreme Court held 
that in paying Soelberg Appellant was a volunteer. Mr. Justice 
Ellett dissented, stating that the Dicks did not need to wait 
until the grace period had expired, and thus risk losing the 
property. In any event, this court held that American National 
Mortgage could legally agree to sell the property with an annual 
payment of $600, even though it had an annual obligation to 
Soelberg of $1,000 (Ex.44). 
Apparently American Hational Mortgage did not make a pay-
ment to Soelberg, and he went to James Dick and complained 
(Dep. p.9). The Dicks complained to Appellant, and he agreed 
to save them harmless from any loss they might suffer by reason 
of Soelberg not being paid, and specifically agreed that he 
would pay American National Mortgage the difference between the 
$600 that the Dicks were oblig.;_ted to pay to American National 
and the $1,000 it owed to Soelberg, and he did so. (R.353). 
This is erroneously charged as being an improper purchase of an 
interest in litigation. It is, of course, no such thing, and 
the Hearing Examiners should have expressly so found. 
The next charge in the complaint is that the Dicks assert 
that they did not have knowledge of, consent to, or in any way 
authorize Appellant to institute the litigation, for or on 
their behalf or in their names (see Count 4, paragraph 4). Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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There was considerable evidence introduced in regard to this 
charge, but there is no finding on it. 'l'he Hearing Examiners 
merely found that Appellant undertook to prosecute litigation 
in the District Court, and a~ appeal to the Supreme Court, 
but are silent as to whether the Dicks knew the suit was filed, 
Again we assert that the Appellant should have been total; 
absolved by an express finding that the Dicks did know of and 
acquiesce in the suit. There really is no dispute in the 
evidence. The complaint is in evidence as Ex. 38. It was filE 
September 12, 1967. 
the plaintiffs. 
It shows that John R. and James Dick are 
When the deposition of John R. Dick was taken, he admitted 
(p.16) that Appellant told him that a suit against Soelberg 
would be necessary. He was asked when he became aware that 
Appellant had brought the suit "on behalf of you and your fathe. 
against American National Mortgage, and he answered, "during 
the period of negotiations with Soelberg, Bob indicated that 
legal action would have to be taken of some nature ... lle then 
filed it in our names" (p.16). He admitted that a demand 
letter threatening suit, dated October 13, 1966, had been sent 
by Appellant, and Mr. Dick said that he assumed that he had 
received a copy of it about the date it bears, because it was 
contained in Mr. Dick's file. A copy of the complaint dated 
September 12, 1967, showing the plaintiffs to be James Dick an: 
John R. Dick was produced from Mr. Dick's files, and Mr. Dick 
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testified (Dep. 18-19) that the handwriting on the complaint 
"Sept. 1967" was his handwriting, and that he would assume that 
that is the date he received it, and that it was fair to say 
that by September of 1967 he knew that Appellant had commenced 
a lawsuit in the name of Mr. Dick and his father. When they 
paid off the contract, the Dicks said they didn't want anything 
more to do with it, and Appellant told them that they would need 
to coperate in the lawsuit (Dep.21). Thereafter, in May of 
1971, they saw some interrogatories in the lawsuit bearing 
their own names (Dep.23). James Dick was interrogated about 
these same matters. Basically he could not remember (Dep.27), 
but he doesn't contradict the testimony of John R. Dick. 
Appellant testified clearly that by sending the demand 
letter (R.356) and the complaint and the answer (R.436) to the 
Dicks, they were advised of the lawsuit (R.436). He discussed 
the suit with them while it was pending (R.357). He also told 
the Dicks that they would have to help with evidence, and that 
they did furnish needed evidence (R.436). He also testified 
that the Dicks had advanced some of the money to pay Soelberg 
and had a financial interest in the lawsuit when he filed it. 
(R.432). This is confirmed by John R. Dick, who testified that 
when Soelberg first told them that he was not being paid, 
they prepaid $600 (Dep. 13). This payment relates to and 
rebuts the charge that the Dicks were not the real parties in 
interest. 
Thus, the charge made in the complaint that the suit was 
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filed without the knowledg8 or consent of the Dicks is contrar~ 
to the uncontradicted evidence. Appellant was entitled to an 
express finding that the Dicks knew he had filed the lawsuit 
in their names. 
The next assertion made in the complaint on the Dick matte: 
is that a "judgment" was enterc~d on "the counterclaim" in the 
sum of $1341.65 (Count Four, p.3). As a matter of fact, there 
was no judgment entered on th0 counterclai~ for $1,341.65. Wh~ 
this court affirmed the lov.'er court it ordered (Ex. 44), "Respon-
dent is entitled to its costs." The attorney for American 
National Mortgage then filed a cost bill, which included so~' 
$1227 in attorney fees. (Ex. 38). No court had awarded attornc1· 
fees in the amount of $1227 or any other amount. Appellant 
filed a motion to tax costs (R.356). Opposing counsel got a 
continuance (R.358), and the matter was not pressed by either 
(R.358). The case was decided in the Utah Supreme Court in 
June of 1973 (Ex.44). In the Fall of 1976, immediately before 
the Election, one of the Dicks was involved in a divorce procc~ 
ing, and a title report showing the cost bill for some $1,341 
was developed (R.358). Mr. Petty called Appellant, and Appell-
ant told him that there was no judgment (R.248, 360). Appellan: 
said that he could get it cleared up, but Mr. Petty wrote a 
letter fixing a deadline, and when it was not met, Mr. Petty 
filed a suit and the story was released to the newspaper on 
the eve of the election (R.361). Mr. Petty admits that 
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Appellant agreed to call up his motion to tax costs (R.255), 
but Mr. Petty filed a civil complaint against Appellant on 
October 28th (R.253). Mr. Petty admits that he is the one who 
filed the complaint with the Bar (R.260) and that he did this 
of his own volition, not on behalf of the Dicks (R.260) and 
James Dick testified that he would not have wanted to complain 
to the Bar (Dep.40). 
This matter was ultimately resolved by Appellant calling 
the motion to tax costs on for hearing. The court disallowed 
attorney fees, and costs were taxed at $18, which Appellant 
paid (R.256,362). 
There is testimony to the effect that Mr. Dick paid some 
attorney a fee (not to Appellant) of $1,100 to get this item 
cleared up (Dep.37). This was referred to by Mr. Stark in 
his opening statement to the hearing examiners (R.15). If any 
attorney charged the Dicks $1,100 to get this cost bill deter-
mined by the court, all we can say is that they were very badly 
overcharged. 
In summary, the complaint charged, and the Hearing Exami-
ners found that the Appellant had not identified the fee owner 
(Soelberg). The charge was not sustained. The finding is 
simply wrong. The complaint charged that Appellant filed the 
suit without the knowledge or consent of the Dicks. The 
charge was not sustained. The findings did not address that 
point at all. The complaint charged that the action was not 
brought in the name of the real party in interest. That charge 
is wro~g. The findings don't address it. The complaint 
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charges that as a result of the litigation a "judcrrnent" was 
granted on a "counterclaim" for $1,341, and the Hearing 
Examiners found that a judgment was entered which clouded the 
title. Surely the Appellant was entitled to a finding that the 
Supreme Court had awarded costs on appeal, the prevailing 
attorney had wrongfully claimed attorney fees, a timely motion 
to tax costs was filed, and a judgment was finally entered for 
$18 which the Appellant paid. The conclusionary finding that 
he did not violate specified canons is simply not adequate, a~ 
the negative findings are not warranted. 
POINT II. COUNT THREE OF COMPLAINT: THE STATE 
V PIEPENBURG CASE. THE FINDINGS ARE 
INADEQUATE IN NOT RESOLVING EVIDENTIARY 
DISPUTES, IN NOT DETERMINING WHETHER A 
C0~1UNITY STANDARD EXISTED AS TO CONFIDENTIAL 
DISCLOSURES, AND IF A STANDARD EXISTED, lmAT 
THAT STANDARD WAS AND THE FINDINGS ARE IN 
ERROR IN CONCLUDING APPELLANT VIOLATED 
BAR CANONS. 
In Count Three, Appellant is charged with an improper 
investigation into the background of prospective jurors in an 
obscenity case. That case also has heretofore reached the 
Supreme Court in State v Piepenburg, 571 P.2d 1299. 
(a) The Charge. Part of the alleged misconduct charged 
included contacting L.D.S. Bishops in the locality of the spe-
cific juror's homes. The complaint, by referrence to Rule IV, 
Canon 7, charged Appellant with a vexatious and harassing 
investigation of the jurors (R.222). It also charged that 
Appellant was interviewed by a local television reporter, and 
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in the interview disclosed the jury investigations and stated 
that because of this background information, he was certain 
that two of the jurors would hold out for conviction. It is 
alleged that at least two of the jurors selected were advised 
prior to the trial that persons associated with the Attorney 
General's office had been investigating them, and this, they 
charged, violated specific Canons of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
(b) The Canons. These canons are again set forth in full 
for the convenience of the court: 
Rule IV Canon 7 
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution 
or defense of a criminal matter shall not, from 
the time of the filing of a complaint, information, or 
indictment, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or 
arrest until the commencement of the trial, or 
disposition of without trial, make or participate in 
making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable 
person would expect to be disseminated by means of 
public communication and that relates to: 
(6) Any opinion as the guilt or innocence of the 
accused, the evidence, or the merits of the case. 
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a 
criminal matter, a lawyer or law firm associated with 
the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall 
not make or participate in making an extrajudicial 
statement that a reasonable person would expect to be 
disseminated by means of public communication and that 
relates to the trial, parties, or issues in the trial 
(J) 
or other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere 
with a fair trial, except that he may quote from or 
refer without comment to public records of the court 
in the case. 
A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his 
employees and associates from making an extrajudicial 
statement that he would be prohibited from making 
under DR 7-107. 
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Rule IV, Canon 7 
(E) A lawyer shall not conduct or cause, by financial 
support or otherwise, another to conduct a vexatious 
or harrassing investigation of either a venireman or i 
juror. 
(F) All restrictions imposed by DR 7-108 upon a lawyer als 
apply to communications with or investigation of 
members of a family of a venireman or a juror. 
During the hearing a questio,, was asked of Mr. Wickstrorr,, 
one of the attorneys representing the Bar, if what they were 
charging was merely the alleged improper interview with the 
reporter and he answered, no, that he read the allegations of 
Count Three as charging Appellant with making a vexatious and 
harrassing investigation of the jurors (R.222). 
(c) The Findings and Decision. The Hearing Examiners 
again made conclusionary type findings and arrived at a legal 
conclusion that the acts described in paragraph 6 of the 
Findings (the background investigation) did not violate the 
provisions of Rule IV, Canon 6 DR 7-108 (E) and (F) (which is 
the canon dealing with vexatious and harrassing investigation 
of jurors). 
The Findings and Decision go on to conclude that Appellant 
did violate Rule IV, Canon DR 7-107 (B) (6) and Canon DR 7-107 
(D), but not 7-107 (J). These, as set forth above, relate to 
the making of an extrajudicial statement concerning the guilt 
or innocence of the accused, and the making of an extrajudicial 
statement that a reasonable person would expect to be publish·,·~ 
(d) The Evidence. We next turn to the evidence. In thi' 
charge we think there was a dispute as Lo the circumstzmcc" 
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under which some of the statements were made. That dispute is 
not resolved by the findings. The dispute is between the 
testimony of Mr. Horton, who was the television reporter, and 
testimony of Appellant. 
Appellant readily admitted that he became associated as 
counsel in the Piepenburg case (R.363), and that he had used 
the resources of the Attorney General's office to make a 
background investigation of the potential jurors (R.366). He 
intended that it be used to make peremtory challenges (R.367). 
There was no personal contact made with any juror at all (R. 
365) . He arranged to have someone from the Attorney General's 
office call an L.D.S. Church official or his wife or a neighbor 
to see if a prospective juror would likely follow the law and 
would be acceptable in a pornography suit (R.366). The Hearing 
Examiners, as noted above, concluded that what he did in 
this investigation did not violate the canons of ethics, as 
charged by the complaint and we will, therefore, not deal 
further with that investigation. 
Appellant is found to have been guilty of unprofessional 
conduct in regard to an interview that he gave to Mr. Horton. 
We first point out to the court that there is a Statement 
of Principles and Guidelines for Reporting, duly adopted by 
the Utah State Bar and the media organizations, which was intro-
duced in evidence as Ex. 33. 
provides that: 
Paragraph 3 of the Principles 
"No trial should be influenced by the pressure of 
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publicity or from public clamor. Lawyers, journalists ... 
share the responsibility to prevent the creation of 
such pressures." 
Appellant testified that he was aware that the Bar and 
the Press had adopted the guidelines (R.406). Ive think that 
this is of importance, because an attorney familiar with the 
adoption of those guidelines had reason lo assume that journal-
ists would accept dual responsibility under the guidelines. 
One of the expert witnesses called by respondent acknowledged 
this (R.109-111) Mr. Horton had not heard of this guideline 
(R.152,154). 
We next refer to the circumstances under which the state-
ments were made by Appellant to Mr. Horton. According to the 
testimony of both Mr. Hansen and Mr. Horton, the jury had been 
impaneled, the court had become concerned about the investi-
gation of the jurors, and a hearing had been held in chambers. 
Mr. Horton had been in the courtroom and knew of the court's 
concern (R.131 and 371). After the hearing in chambers, Mr. 
Horton wanted to know what had taken place and Appellant said 
that the judge was concerned about whether they were actually 
contacting jurors. Appellant said that he had told the judge 
that he had not contacted any jurors, and the judge was satis-
fied that they were only conducting a background investigation, 
and not endeavoring to influence how the jurors voted (R. 371.) 
He intended Mr. Horton to publish that interview (R.372-3). 
That interview occurred at counsel table. Mr. Horton tcstifir 
that he took notes (R.132). 
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Appellant testified that he then terminated the interview 
by asking if there was anything else Mr. Horton needed, (R. 
373) and Mr. Horton said, no, and they went out to go to lunch. 
As they were leaving the building, at the outside door, Mr. 
Horton asked another question, preceded with words such as, 
"incidentally", or "by the way'', how do you think you did with 
the jury. Appellant answered that because of what he thought 
was a pretty good background investigation on five of the eight 
jurors, that two of them would be strong enough for a prosecu-
ti0n on a movie that "was this dirty--and I had seen the movie" 
that they would not acquit (R.374). It was not his intent that 
these remarks be broadcast. He thought they were off the 
record. The reporter didn't have his recording equipment 
with him and was not taking notes (R.374). 
was broadcast (Ex.10). 
This conversation 
It is at this point that the testimony of Appellant and 
the testimony of Mr. Horton are not in harmony, and the findings 
do not address the problem, nor resolve the conflict. 
We submit that Mr. Horton was not candid at the disciplin-
ary hearing. He admitted that he was in court all morning 
(R.131). He testified about what Appellant told him (R.132), 
said he was taking notes (R.133), and then he said, "at one 
point, I asked him," now that the jury has been selected what 
he thought of the outcome, and he indicated that he believed 
some jurors would not permit acquittal, and that when this 
statement was made, they were at counsel table (R.133) · 
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lie was asked on cross-exumination (R.139) if there was not 
quite a furor about the possibility that a prior interview wit~ 
Mr. Deamer might be released to the public, and he said he 
wouldn't describe it that way, but did testify that Mr. Deamer 
was sufficiently concerned about his int,·rview, that he had 
called and gone down to the station to sec it. Mr. Horton 
was asked if that story, which had been aired the night before, 
was not one of the problems being addressed by Judge Leary, a~ 
he said, "not to my knowledCJC" (R.139). Ile was asked if he 
inquired of Appellant as to what hu.d happened in chambers, and 
he said he might have (R.140). He was there when the attorneys 
went into chambers (R.140). He was asked what the hearing was 
about, and he said he didn't know; that Mr. O'Connell was upset 
about something. He thinks it was because Mr. Horton wanted 
to take pictures in the courtroom, and that at that point he 
doesn't know what O'Connell had heard about the jury investi-
gation (R.141). His attention was then directed to a deposit~ 
he had given November 2, 1977 (R.141) where he had testified 
(R.142) that Mr. O'Connell became aware "of this jury backgrour .. 
thing. This issue had come up and he got quite perturbed. I 
can't remember exactly how he found out. He may have overhearG 
Mr. Hansen and I talking about it. Anyway, the attorneys went 
into chambers for a few minutes,'' (R.142). Mr. Horton on 
cross-examination said that his deposition was not correct. 
It was the photographs which he had not been permitted to take 
and not the jury investigation which made Mr. O'Connell ups•' 
(R.142). He was cross-examinec1 at some length about this, a1·: Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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all we can do is ask the court to read it, beginning at R. 143. 
The news release that he actually used on the air was in 
harmony with what he said in his deposition, and not in harmony 
with what he testified on cross-examination (see Ex. 10). It 
seems contrary to common sense that there would have been a 
serious problem about him taking pictures. He asked permission 
to take them. Permission was denied, and none was taken. This 
should not have upset anybody but him. But the defense attorney 
was very upset, and in Mr. Horton's deposition and in the news 
release (Ex.10) which he wrote, Mr. Horton said that Mr. 
O'Connell was upset about the jury investigation. Appellant 
directly contradicts Mr. Horton on this (R.370). Appellant 
testified that the interview which he intended to make public, 
which had taken place at the counsel table (R.370) and at which 
Mr.Horton said he took notes, (R.132) related to the background 
investigation. That interview ended and they walked out of the 
building to the outside door. It was at this point, according 
to Appellant, that the question was asked about how Appellant 
thought he came out on the jury (R.374). On direct examination 
Mr. Horton said that this conversation had occurred at counsel 
table as a part of the overall interview (R.133). On cross-
examination, beginning at R.149, he indicated that this may 
have occurred when they were walking out the door. This 
difference in the testimony, it seems to us, is quite material 
as to whether Appellant should have anticipated that the 
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statement should have been published, and thus would be a 
violation by him of Canon 7, DR 7-107 (B) (6) and (D). Appell-
ant testified unequivocally th:1t he intended the interview at 
counsel table to be used. lie knew he was talking to a reporter. 
He can't remember whether the reporter was taking notes (R. 375), 
but the reporter said he was (H..132), and they talked about the 
background inve~tigation. The h~ariny examiners concluded 
that making the investigation violated no canon, but it is 
impossible to tell from the way the findings are set up whether 
the examiners thought telling the press about the background 
investigation violated the canon. We submit that these should 
have been separated. Appellant admits that he told the reporte~ 
about the background investigation, and said he intended that 
to be published (R.425 and 428). He said that under different 
circumstances, as they were walking out of the courthouse 
building, he was asked, incidentally, or by the way, how did~ 
think he came out, and he said under those circumstances he 
thought he was off the record, and made the comment about two 
jurors probably holding out for conviction. He did not intend 
that statement to be made public (R.374). The reporter was 
not taking notes (R.375). Appellant thought that the journal-
ist shared the responsibility with him under the Principles a~ 
Guidelines (Ex.33) and would not publish it (R.408). The 
examiners put these two conversations together (Findings 6(d)I 
They do not address the question of whether the statements \v(" 
all made at the counsel table, as Mr. Horton first testified, 
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or whether what to us is the critical statement (about how the 
jury would vote) was made under different circumstances, as 
they went out the door (R.374). The findings are not helpful 
on this point--they don't tell us whether the panel (a) believed 
that Mr. Horton was told by Appellant of the judge's concern 
about the background investigation of the jury nor (b) whether 
the conversation about how the jury might vote and the interview 
on the background investigation took place at the counsel table, 
or at two different times and places. 
We submit that Appellant had the right to rely on the 
journalist following the Principles and Guidelines (Ex.33). 
The reporter had been in court and knew of the judge's concern 
after the conference in chambers. It thus was not unreasonable 
for Appellant to assume that the conversation going out the 
front door would not be published. We further submit that Mr. 
Horton was evasive and his testimony was contradictory, and 
where there is a conflict between his testimony and Appellant's, 
Appellant's should be accepted. 
Logic also confirms the credibility of Mr. Hansen's test-
imony that his predictions regarding the jurors' decision was 
not to be broadcast. It is not reasonable to conclude that 
an experienced trial attorney would want a juror to hear 
broadcast a statement that one of the prosecuting attorneys 
had the juror "in his pocket." What more offensive statement 
could a prosecutor make to a juror who is going to rule on his 
case than this statement? 
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Finally, we submit that it was error for the hearing 
examiners to take testimony at length from the television and 
newspaper journalists as to what reporters could be expected 
to publish (R.99,100,172,189,206). That isn't the test, and 
we objected to it. 
The canon deals with what a reasonable person would expect 
to be disseminated and the testimony of the journalists as to 
what they would do or what reporters would do was not the iss~. 
When they were asked what an attorney would probably think, 
they said frankly they didn't know R.199, 210). 
The inconsistent testimony of the parade of reporters 
called by the prosecution could not establish a community 
standard as to lawyers confidential disclosures. Yet the 
findings are silent on this critical issue. 
There was no competent testimony concerning a community 
standard, other than Ex. 33, which is the Principles and Guide-
lines. This puts joint responsibility on the attorney and on 
the reporter. Mr. Horton had been in the courtroom al 1 morning, 
and he knew what was going on and what the problem was with the 
jury, and it was not unreasonable for Appellant to assume that 
he would not broadcast the conversations they had while they 
were leaving the outside door after the formal interview was 
over and they had walked outside. 
We submit the most that can be said of Appellant's con-
versation under these circumstances is that he made a judgment 
error in relying on the principles and Guidelines and what he 
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considered was the ''off the record" nature of his disclosure. 
The courts have not considered a mistake in judgment a basis 
for disciplinary action. State ex rel State Bar Association 
v Pinkett (1953), 157 Neb.509, 60 NW 2d 641; In re Mason (1947 
Mo. App.) 203 SW 2d 750. 
This court has determined that the burden of proof of 
persuasion of misconduct should be by clear and convincing 
evidence, In re Macfarlane 10 Ut.2d 217, 219; 350 P.2d 631. 
Certainly the evidence relied on in this count is not "clear 
and convincing." 
For the Hearing Examiners to find a violation of the 
canon and to recommend suspension of Appellant under these 
circumstances is not proper. 
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POINT III. COUNT TIW OF COMPU\INT: THE WINOT'A EMARINE 
MATTER. THE FINDINGS ARE MISLEADING IN 
CONCLUDING APPELLANT DID NOT MAINTAIN 
COMPLETE AND ADEQUATE RECORDS AND DID 
NOT MAINTAIN THE FUNDS IN A SEPARATE 
TRUST ACCOU~T, THE FINDINGS ARE INADEQUATE 
IN NOT SETTING OUT THE MITIGATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES AUD IN ERROR I~ CONCLUDING 
A CRIMINAL VIOLATION 
(a) The Charge. Appellant is charged in Count Two with 
collecting money for Wino11a Ernarinc_· and fLliling to notify the 
client of the receipt of funds; failing to render a proper 
accounting; failing to maintain complete and adequate records; 
failing to pay the funds over to his client promptly upon 
demand; failing to maintain said funds in a separate trust 
account and committing a misdemeanor. 
(b) The Canons. The particular Rules of Professional 
Conduct allegedly violated are as follows: 
Rule IV, Canon 9 
(B) A Lawyer shall: 
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his 
funds, securities, or other properties. 
(2) Identify and label securities and properties of 
a client promptly upon receipt and place them in 
a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping 
as soon as practicable. 
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities 
and other properties of a client coming into the 
possession of the lawyer and render appropriate 
accounts to his client regarding them. 
UCA 78-51-42. Refusing to pay over money--Penalty.--
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An attorney and counselor who receives money or pro-
perty of his client in the course of his professional 
business and who refuses to pay or deliver the same 
to the person entitled thereto within a reasonable time 
after demand is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(c) Findings and Decision. The Findings and Decision of 
the examiners, again in conclusionary type findings, found 
Appellant to be in violation in regard to all of the charges. 
We submit that the findings on this count are, at the best, 
unfair in the light of the total record. In regard to the 
keeping of accounting records and the deposit of the funds in 
the trust account, they are misleading. Further, the hearing 
examiners did not address themselves at all to any findings 
regarding mitigating circumstances. 
(d) The Evidence. The material evidence on this count is 
as follows: 
Appellant did represent Mrs. Emarine in a divorce action 
and thereafter in the collection of child support. The divorce 
action was filed in June of 1962 (Ex.40), and until 1966, 
payments went directly to her (R.40). Beginning in 1966, 
payments were made to the Clerk of the Court, and released to 
Appellant. He had a power of attorney, authorizing him to cash 
the checks (R.40-41), and she got payments from 1966 to 1969 
(R. 41). 
Appellant was extensively involved in the collection of 
commercial accounts. At the peak of his activity he was 
handling approximately 500 accounts, and received approximately 
100 payments a month thereon (R.309) 
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Appellant had a certified ~ublic accountant set up a 
bookeeping system for him, and throughout more than 20 years 
of practice he maintained a separate trust account into which 
he deposited trust monies (R.371,326). Both he and his long-
time secretary testified how the system worked. A receipt book 
was kept, and receipts were written as the money came in (R. 
325,384). His bookeeper, Mrs. Pennington, posted all the 
receipts to a client ledger card (R.329). He had two separate 
accounts with separate deposit slips, separate account numbers, 
and separate checks. One was a trust account, and the other 
was a legal account (R.328,381). All of the money that came 
in found its way into the receipt book (R.329). If the secre-
tary had a question as to whether it was to be deposited in the 
trust account or in the legal account, she put a question mark 
on it, and Appellant marked the receipt with a T, if it was 
to go into the trust account, and with an L, if it was to go 
into the law account (R.311). Ex. 47A is an example of one of 
those receipts. The collection would include funds for the 
client, and it would also include Appellant's attorney fee 
(R.329-334). Mrs. Pennington would post the receipt to the 
client's ledger card (R.329). She prepared a check to remit 
the funds to the client but she would hold it for ten days, so 
that the check she had received would have time to clear. At 
that point she would notify the client that the money had been 
received and that they would remit the funds within ten days 
(R.306, 336). She would then periodically withdraw the 
attorney fees from the trust account and deposit them to the 
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legal account, and mark her books accordingly (R.330,331). 
The system was in effect when she went to work in 1959, and 
she was requested to continue it (R.325), and there is no 
indication of any problems with the system while he was in the 
private practice and maintaining an office and fulltime help 
(R.315). He closed his office and moved to his home in early 
1969 (R.322, 385). Mrs. Pennington's employment changed to 
part-time in February of 1969 (R.311). She worked one day a 
week in the office in Appellant's home (R.314). She worked on 
this basis until she quit in March of 1975 (R.315). From 1969 
to 1975 she did not generally make out the checks to the client, 
but she did post the receipts, make some of the bank deposits, 
etc. She quit issuing the check to the client, because she 
no longer knew the fee arrangement (R.319), and others might 
already have done it (R.334). After Appellant moved to his 
home other people made deposits, but the receipt was attached 
to the deposit slip (R.333). She maintained a ledger card on 
the Emarine account (R.335). When she made the check out to 
the client, she left all three copies of the check and voucher 
together for ten days, to let the check clear (R.340). She 
would get Appellant to sign the check, would file the copies and 
send out the original check. She would post the transaction 
twice a month (R.337). 
Mrs. Emarine's name, at the time of the divorce was 
Belcher (Ex.40). The checks that Appellant collected were 
written by Mr. Belcher and sent to the County Clerk beginning 
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inl966 (H.41). hpp::llanl pickc·c1 them ur anc1 had a pow~r 
ot attor:icy so that he COL'lcl cash them (!\.41), l·lciny ol' the 
cnnrPl led checks issued by Mr. ;lelcher \\'ere obtained, as 
r:oted below, after t'.1is disjJul" orose, <.me they are in evic1encr 
(R. 50-53). On the backs of m,rny of those ch2cks are bank stamps 
indicating the deposit to the account of Robert B. Hansen. 
A question was asked during the hearings as to whether or not 
these had in fact gone into his legal account, rather than the 
trust account. It was explained that some of his part-time 
help had apparently used lhe wrong bank stamp, but that the 
deposit slip which accomponied the check was for the trust 
account, and the checks had gone into the correct account in 
most instances (R.443). The deposit slips were put in evi-
dence as Ex. 57 (R.418, 443). The C.P.A. had gone through 
the deposit slips, to determine whether or not the checks had 
gone into the trust account or into the law account. 
study reveals that the deposit slip used controlled. 
That 
Two exhibits were prepared by the C.P.A. covering the 
Emarine account. At the time of the divorce her name was 
Belcher. It later changed to Tucker, and then to Emarine, 
and ledger cards and records reflect all three names (R.335). 
Ex. 56 compared the receipts maintained by the Appellant with 
the ledger cards maintained by the County Clerk, and notes 
that the receipts agree with the County Clerk records. Ex. 
56 shows a total of 75 checks, and all but six of them went 
into the correct account. The first one thi'lt went into tlw L' 
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account was received 12-18-68, and the other five which went 
into the law account arc the next five checks received, begin-
ning 1-17-69, and continuing through 4-29-69. This corres-
ponds with the time when Appellant was moving from his private 
office to his home in early 1969 (R.322,385), and his adult 
children started making some deposits. Ex. 56 shows that the 
receipt system indicated that a deposit should have been made 
to the trust account, but the actual deposit slips show that 
they were deposited to the law account. The court will recall 
that the receipt system used receipted for every check, and then 
the receipt was marked with a T if the money was to go into the 
trust account, and with an L if the money was to go into the 
law account. The final note on the first page of Ex. 56 
states that the receipts correctly indicated that these should 
have gone into the trust account, but the deposit slips were 
for the law account. There is no showing that this was inten-
tional. There is an affirmative showing that the time corres-
ponds with his move from his downtown office to his home, 
where his children were just starting to make deposits (R. 
385-6). Further, the deposit caused no problem. Ex. 32, 
which consists of six checks from Appellant to Mrs. Emarine, 
shows that these funds were promptly disbursed to her. Appell-
ant also confirmed this. He said that all of those which went 
into the lejal account went out properly (R.416). This is 
also summarized on t.x. 56. 
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If this is the commingling of funds, which the llcarinci 
Examiners found, we resp._·ctfully submit that the findings 
should have specifically addressed what happened. We think 
that the uncontroverted record showed that the l\.ppellant had 
a bookeeping system set up by a firm of certified public 
accountants (R.381), that the system always has included a 
law firm account and a separate trust account (R.328). When 
the money was received, a receit•l was prepared in a receipt 
book (R. 325), and the receipt book was marl~ed with a T or with 
an L, to indicate which account the funds should be deposited 
in (R.311). Great numbers of checks were handled, and even on 
the Belcher-Tucker-Emarine account, al of the checks except 
six went into the trust account (Exs. 56,57), and the six 
which were erroneously deposited into the law firm account 
were deposited during the same general period, which coincided 
with the Appellant closing his downtown office and moving into 
his home (R.385), where his children began to help with the 
deposits (R.385-6). All of these checks which miscarried into 
the law account were disbursed, and no mischief was caused 
thereby (R.416). There is a technical violation of the Code of 
Professional Conduct on comingling, but the circumstances under 
which this occurred do not, we respectfully urge, warrant a 
suspension from the practice of law. 
At this point, in the interest of continuity, we deem it 
advisable to note two other exhibits. One is Ex. 47 covering 
37 collections made from Leslie Booth on behalf of Franklin 
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Life-Lowrys, and Ex. 59, which covers some disbursements to 
Lowry and disbursements to Winona Belcher, Tucker, Emarine. 
On the 37 collections made from Booth for the benefit of 
Franklin Life-Lowrys, none are shown to have been deposited 
otherwise than to the trust account. On Ex. 59, showing the 
disbursements to Lowry and Emarine, all of the disbursements 
are from the trust account, except one in March of 1967. 
Whether or not this is another isolated check which got into the 
law account is not explained by the evidence. 
Thus, the Appellant had a system which included a separate 
trust account for his client's funas, and the trust account was 
being consistently used. The six deposits by someone while he 
was moving from his off ice downtown to his home are exceptions 
to the ongoing practice, and in every case, except possibly 
one, disbursement was promptly made to the client. 
The conclusionary finding of the Hearing Examiners in 
paragraph 5 (i) to the effect that he failed to keep the Emarine 
monies in a separate trust account is thus misleading. 
He did ultimately close his trust account, in the belief 
that the funds remaining in it were his (R.416, 292). 
There is a finding, ilo. 5 (d), that Appellant failed to 
maintain complete and adequate records of the funds he collected 
for Mrs. Emarine. That finding does not reflect what the 
record shows. Mrs. Pennington testified that she did maintain 
ledger cards under the names Belcher, Tucker and Emarine 
(R.335), and there simply isn't any evidence that the bookeeping 
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when Appellant moved to his home and ultimately went into a 
career practice with the State and stopped the private practic0 
of law, his records were in cardboard boxes some 40 to 50 in 
number (R.388) and he could not find her ledger card (R.389, 
402). There was no effort on his part to conceal the amount of 
money collected. He prepared an affidavit in December of 1974 
(Ex.12). He got the information from the County Clerk (R.4tJ, 
400-402). He sent the affidavit to Mrs. Emarine, and from it 
she discovered that the records showed payments she hadn't 
received (R.42-44). She was living in Hawaii, and was about to 
come back to Utah, and so she waited until she returned to 
Salt Lake (R.46). She had received the money from 1966 to 
July of 1969 (R. 41), by which later date he had closed his offic 
She hadn't heard from Appellant between 1969 and 1974, but she 
did receive a letter in 1974 (Ex.42) which enclosed the affi-
davit (Ex.12) reciting the monies received. Ap?ellant told 
her that the figure came from the court, and she inquired as 
to who got the money (R.44), and he didn't answer (R.46). \'/hen 
she came back to Utah in July of 197 5, she called several times. 
She testified that he put her off, saying that he would hdVC 
to have time to check his records (R.47). When she got here, 
she tried to get an accounting but Appellant could not readily 
get into his books--and this is far different from the charge 
in the finding, that he did not maintain books. Mrs. Penningt~ 
testified that she made a ledger card under all those names--
Belcher, Tucker and I:marine (R. 335), and Appel] ant testifircl 
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he did not prepare and maintain them (R.413). He did get the 
county records (R.44), but he was not sure all of the checks 
had cleared, and had the impression (which turned out to be 
wrong) that some had not (R.415). On August 12, 1975, he wrote 
attempting to get Mr. Belcher's checks so that he could find 
out the amount of money he owed (Ex.16). He wrote to Mrs. 
Emarine on March 3, 1975, and sent her a copy of the court's 
records of payments made, and told her his records were not 
readily accessible (Ex.14). She got Attorney Quentin Alson to 
assist, and paid him a $100 retainer (R.58,65). The newspaper 
reporter called Appellant, and said that Mrs. Emarine had com-
plained at having to pay two attorneys, and Appellant voluntarily 
paid the $100 retainer to Mr. Alston (R.404). This was during 
the election campaign. As noted, Appellant could not find his 
records. He wrote to Mr. Belcher, to try to get the checks, 
went to the bank to look at microfilms, he went to the Clerk's 
office to check the records, he hired Mrs. Pennington, to try 
to find the records, he searched for them himself, and hired a 
CPA to review the records, but could not readily find the records 
he needed. There is no evidence to contradict his testimony 
and that of Mrs. Pennington that records were kept but because 
he had closed his office and put his records in boxes that 
could not be found. He did not deny that he had a duty to render 
an accounting. He just could not find his records. As the 
checks of Mr. Belcher were found and the account was recon-
structed, he promptly paid. As Mr. Belcher's checks were 
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gradually located, Mr. Alston identified preliminarily some 
monies he thought were due, and Appellant promptly paid them, 
after deducting his fee for collection (R.72-3). Mr. Alston 
then got further evidence that more money was due, and reque:otea 
payment of $1,285. This request was made September 16, 1976 
(Ex. 22, R.81). Appellant deposited that amount with the Clerk 
of the Court on September 27th (Ex.2G, R.82). Mrs. Emarine 
got addition al Belcher checks (Ex. 30) and again Appellant prompt-' 
ly paid the additional money (R.8G) and the account was fully 
settled (R.119,121). 
Appellant testified that he was not aware that money was 
being received and that it was not being disbursed (R.382,393). 
He also did not respond as quickly as he should have to the 
requests of the clients that he straighten out their accounts 
and pay the money he owed, but the record does not disclose any 
willful or intentional withholding of their money. To the 
extent the funds were deposited in his le;al account--and this 
rarely occurred and then only on the Emarine account--it was 
inadvertent and caused no harm (R.416). To the extent that he 
was not aware that the funds had come in and not been disbursed 
(R.392) he is careless, but this does not warrant a one year 
suspension. 
Appellant was entitled to an unequivocal finding on this 
Count that he maintained complete and adequate records and th~ 
the monies paid for Mrs. Emarine's benefit were deposited in a 
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trust account except for 6 payments which, although placed in 
a legal account, were promptly and properly paid to the client. 
The findings, dealing with a single set of facts, determin-
ed that failing to pay over money to the client not only con-
stituted a violation of the bar canons but also was a crimi-
nal violation of 78-51-42 UCA. The bar has no jurisdiction to 
determine a misdemeanor and certainly the bar proceeding held 
in this case did not afford the Appellant the safeguards 
traditionally allowed in a criminal proceeding. 
Appellant was also entitled to a finding that although he 
Jid not pay over some of the paym~nts due the client promptly 
and was not able to render an accounting upon immediate demand, 
it was not a willful withholding and the seriousness of the 
offense was mitigated because: 
(1) Appellant moved more than a 20 year collection of 
records from his private office to his home because of his accep-
tance of the public practice of law with the Attorney General's 
off ice and a particular record was not thereafter readily 
accessible. 
(2) He reduced his professional clerical help because of 
this change in status. 
(3) The account was an old one, continuing for a period 
from a point in time more than 15 years from the date of charge 
to 3 years before the charge, making more difficult the 
retention and retrieval of records. 
(4) He was in the midst of an election campaign when the 
accounting was demanded and had precommitted excessive demands 
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on his time. 
(5) When he was unable to locate his own records, he exert 
reasonable efforts to reconstruct the account. 
(6) lie promtitly paid all sums the reconstructed accountinc: 
showed due. 
In numerous cases it has been held or recognized that 
absence of a fraudulent or evil inttcnt is a mitigating circum-
stance which should be taktcn into consideration in determining 
the extent of the discipline imposed. Sec the collection of 
cases in 96 ALR 2d 857 §19. 
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POHJT IV. COUNT ONE OF C0:-1PLAINT: FRAIJKLIN LIFE-LO\'IRY 
MATTEH. THE FINDINGS ARE MISLEADING IN CON-
CLUDING APPELLANT DID NOT MAINTAIN COMPLETE AND 
ADEQUATE RECORDS, AND DID NOT MAINTAIN THE 
FUNDS IN A SEPARATE TRUST ACCOUNT. THEY ARE 
ERRONEOUS IN CONCLUDJ;-<G APPELLANT WAS GUILTY 
OF NEGLECT, AND IN CONCLUDING A CRIMINAL 
VIOLATION, AND INADEQUATE IN NOT SETTING 
OUT THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. 
(a) The Charge. On this matter, Appellant is charged in 
almost identical language as in the Emarine case--with comming-
ling funds, not keeping adequate records, not notifying the 
client of the receipt of money, and not disbursing promptly. 
The canons of ethics are those as set forth above on the Emarine 
matter. 
On this matter, he is also charged with not completing his 
work, which involved trying to make a collection from a Mr. 
Gardner and a Mr. Boothe. 
(b) Evidence. The evidence in regard to the accounting 
records kept and the manner of depositing client's funds, in-
eluding the Lowry funds, is detailed above. Appellant did have 
a trust account. He did have an accounting system with client 
ledger cards. He did keep receipt books. The receipts were 
posted and the money was disbursed, all as is detailed in the 
Emarine Count. 
In paragraph 4(g) of the Findings, the Hearing Examiners 
concluded that Appellant failed to maintain the funds collected 
for Franklin Life-Lowry in a separate trust account, and com-
mingling the same with his own funds. We do not believe that 
this finding is in accord with the evidence. Part of the funds 
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collected came from one Leslie L. Boothe. Ex.47 is a eompila-
tion of 37 payments made by Boothe. None of these appear to 
have been deposited to the legal account. 
Ex. 59 shows 11 disbursements by the Appellant to Lowry, ar. 
all 11 of those checks were drclwn on tlw trust account. We 
don't believe that there is any exhibit or any testimony showin 
that the Franklin Life-Lowry money was commingled. It is true 
that sometime after Appellant closed his law offices, moved his 
files into his home, and went to work full time for the Attorne; 
General's office, he assumed that the money remaining in the 
trust account was his own (R.292), and he drew the money out ar 
used it, but that is not the commingling charged in the com-
plaint, nor covered by the findings. 
The Hearing Examiners also found (Finding 4(c)) that 
Appellant failed to maintain complete and adequate records of 
the funds to be collected. Again, we do not believe that this 
finding is supported by the evidence. 
Appellant,as detailed above in the Emarine Count, testifi~ 
that the beekeeping system he was using was set up by a firm 
of certified public accountants (R.381). When the money came 
in, a receipt was written therefor (R.302,391-2). Mrs. Pennin~ 
ton, who did the in-house beekeeping, testified about the systc 
(R.306,330), and there is no dispute about the fact that the 
Appellant always maintained a trust account with its own check! 
and its own deposit slips and a legal account with separate 
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checks and separate deposit slips (R.306,326,328,391). The 
trust account had been maintained for more than 20 years (R. 
391,325). After the receipt was written Mrs. Pennington posted 
the receipt to client ledger cards (R.306). She, at that time, 
(R.336) advised the client of the receipt of the money and that 
it would be disbursed within about ten days, when the check had 
cleared. She also at that time wrot~ the check to the client, 
but held the check itself and the vouchers (copies) for approxi-
mately ten days. When the check cleared, the funds were dis-
bursed to the client (R.336). The system worked well from 1964 
to 1969 (R.315). The money went in the correct accounts, and 
the checks disbursing the money were sent to the clients (R. 
315). The receipt book was marked with a T to indicate that 
the check should be deposited to the trust account and with an 
L to indicate that it should be deposited to the legal account 
(R.306). The receipt books were posted to the client ledger 
cards about twice a month (R.329,337). Mrs. Pennington did 
testify that one of the Lowry ledger cards was incomplete, but 
she also said that there may have been a card under Franklin 
Life (the original client for whom suit was filed) R.247, Ex.8), 
and that she may have completed the Lowry card from the Franklin 
sheet (R.346). This does not prove the records were not kept. 
We respectfully submit that the Appellant had an adequate 
accounting system. However, when he moved from his downtown 
office to his home and started to work on a full-tim~ basis in 
the Attorney General's office, the system broke down. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-39-
His longtime secretary and bookeeµer worked only a six hoc 
day, once a week (R.327). She posted the receipts to the cus-
tomer's ledger card (R.327), but she no longer assumed the res-
ponsibility of notifying the client that the money had been 
received. She further discontinued issuing the checks, becaus~ 
she no longer knew the amount of the attorney fee, and did not 
know whether someone else had already issued the check (R.334). 
The result was that funds were µaid and deposited by his µart-
time help (R. 385). Appellant admitedly should have, but did nc' 
follow the matter to the extent of knowing that the money was 
being received and that it was not being disbursed (R.276,392). 
On the Lowry matter it is clear that the initial client 
was an insurance company--Franklin Life. The complaints again~ 
Messrs. Gardner and Boothe were filed in the name of Franklin 
Life (Exs. 8 & 9 for the two Gardner suits and Ex. 52 for the 
complaint in the Boothe suit). Mr. Lowry was the agent for 
Franklin Life, and he asked Appellant to pay the money to him. 
Appellant considered Franklin Life to be the client, Lowry to 
be the agent, and he obeyed the instructions. Appellant simply 
assumed that this was agreeable with Franklin Life (R.382-4). 
Some of the checks were made payable to Mr. Lowry, and after hr 
died other checks were made payable to Mrs. Lowry (see, for 
example, Ex. 59). However, Mrs. Lowry herself testified that 
she had never talked to or received a letter from the Appellant 
(R.20) and technically the attorney-client relationship was 
never established between the Appellant and Mrs. Lowry as an 
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275). She did become executor of the James E. Lowry estate 
(R.18) and she did by letter (Ex.4) request an accounting. 
The letter is dated March 4, 1971. The original of this letter 
was introduced as Ex. 55, and on the bottom of it is a notation 
from Appellant to his secretary which he said was intended to 
have the secretary follow through on it (R.393). His notation 
appears to be dated May 8th. Mrs. Lowry did get a ledger card 
(R.25). This was attached to a letter of July 1, 1976, in which 
Appellant indicates that he had collected $449.08 on the Leslie 
Boothe account, and that the check represented the balance due. 
(R.25). He also offered to pay 50% of the amount still due 
from Gardner--not because he had guaranteed (R.29) that he could 
nake the collection, but because she had complained that he had 
not properly pursued the work (R.26,30). Ex.7 is the offer to 
pay which she declined. She was asked on cross-examination if 
the $162.72 that Appellant tendered was not the correct balance, 
and she said she didn't know (R.31). Her son also requested an 
accounting and did not get it (R.37). Appellant testified that 
he filed the suits for Franklin Life (R.377); that the money 
collected from Boothe also reduced the Gardner debt (R.378); that 
he moved to his home and put the records in boxes (R.377-8); 
that he could not find the records nor his file on the Gardner 
lawsuit. He however, had finally located it in a vertical file 
in his furnace room the Saturday before the hearing (R.388). 
He describes the extent of his search in an effort to get the 
recorJs (R.389), a11d that he did not know the money was not 
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he thought Mrs. Pennington had obtained and sent the requestcJ 
information (R.393). He could not find all the Franklin Life 
ledger cards (R.394). He tendered $162.72 principal and $81 
in interest, which he got from part of the ledger cards which 
he was able to find, going forward from 1967 (R.394). He 
unequivocally testified that every cent of the Franklin Life-
Lowry money went into the trust account, "I know it did," 
(R.392). He was requested to turn the file over to another 
attorney if he was too busy. He testified that he thought he 
could handle it, b~t another reason he didn't turn it over to 
another attorney is that he coulc1n' t find the file (R. 398). He 
also testified that one of the Lowry letters which was sent to 
him was recently found unopened, and he didn't know why (R. 
421). He also testified that when he met with the Bar on Mrs. 
Lawry's complaint, the Bar told him to get her the best inform~ 
tion "you have got available, and see if you can't satisfy 
her." It was after that that he made the tender of the settle-
ment check to her (R.424). 
We believe there is a technical defense to the Franklin 
Life-Lowry charge. The client was Franklin Life. Mr. Lowry 
was its agent and upon his death the agency relationship ter-
minated. There is no showing that Mrs. Lowry was an agent of 
Franklin Life. The evidence involved Appellant's failure to 
account to and pay over to Mrs. Lowry. 
We believe there are two technical defenses to the neglec: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-42-
charge in the Lowry matter. The last activity in the Franklin 
Life-Lowry matter occurred in 1966 (Ex.59). The complaint 
was filed with the Bar Commission in 1977. If the 3 year 
statute of limitations as prescribed by the Bar in Rule 10 of 
the Rules of Discipline, amended February 9, 1977, is to be 
meaningful, it must preclude an 11 year lapse between the last 
activity in the matter on which a neglect charge is claimed 
and the bringing of a complainL. As a second technical defense 
to the neglect charge, the Am0rican Bar Association issued 
informal opinion No. 1273 in 1973, which holds that the word 
"neglect" means a pattern of inaction and does not include a 
single instance of neglect no matter how gross. It states: 
"Neglect involves indifference and a consistent failure 
to carry out the obligations which the lawyer has assumed 
to his client, or a conscious disregard for the respon-
sibility owed to the client. The concept of ordinary 
negligence is different. Neglect usually involves more 
than a single act or omission. Neglect cannot be found 
if the acts or omissions complained of were inadvertent 
or the result of an error of judgment made in good 
faith." 
In other words, a lawyer is not guilty of neglect unless he 
knows he is performing incompetently or knows that he ought to 
be performing when he isn't. 
Appellant was entitled to an unequivocal finding on this 
count, as in the Emarine count, that he maintained complete and 
adequate records and that the monies paid for Franklin Life-
Lowry's benefit were deposited in a trust account. 
Appelllant was also entitled to a finding that although he 
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did not pay over the sum of money due Franklir1 Life promptly 
and was not able to render an accounting upon immediate demand, 
it was not a willful withholding and the seriousness of the 
offense was mitigated because (1) Appellant moved more than 
a 20 year collection of records from his private office to his 
home because of his acceptanct' of the public practice of law 
with the Attorney General's office and a particular record was 
not thereafter readily acccssiulc, (2) he reduced his profcssio: 
al clerical help because of this chancrc in status, ( 3) the 
account was an old one which had been inactive since 1966, 
making more difficult the retention and retrieval of records, 
(4) he was in the midst of an election campaign when the 
accounting was demanded and had precommitted excessive demands 
on his time, (5) when he located the Franklin Life ledger card, 
he sent a copy of it to the client and promptly paid the sums 
the accounting showed were due, (6) he followed the counsel of 
the Bar Commission in determining as best he could the amount 
due and making prompt settlement thereof, and (7) he went the 
extra mile and tendered half of the balance due from an account 
that would ordinarily have been written off as a bad debt. 
The Franklin Life-Lowry claim, as with the Emarine claim, 
is one in which there is a complete absence of fraudulent 
or evil intent. That fact should have been taken into account 
as a mitigating circumstance in determining the extent of the 
discipline imposed. Sec the collection of cases in 96 ALR 2d 
852, §19. 
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THL PINDI~GS ARE ERRO~LOUS IN CONCLUDI~G THE ATTORNEY 
GE:n:R;\L IS SUDJEC'1' TO l'RECLUSIO'.' BY TllE BAR FROM 
PRACTICE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES. 
The office of Attorney General is, in Utah, an office 
established by the Constitution. The qualifications and duties 
of office are described by the Constitution. See Constitution 
of Utah, Article VII, Sections 1, 3 and 18. 
The Constitution provides a method for removal of the 
Attorney General from his office. See Article 6, Sections 17, 
18 and 19. 
When an office such as the Attorney General, which is 
mandated by the Constitution, is coupled with a Constitutional 
provision for removal from office, it has traditionally been 
held to mean that the Constitutional method for removal is the 
exclusive method of removal. See 63 AmJur 2d Public Officers 
and Employees, §178 and the cases cited in footnote 65. The 
Utah Constitution and the Utah Statutes provide that the Attor-
ney General shall practice law in the official capacity as 
Attorney General. See Utah Constitution, Article VII, §18 
and 67-5-1 UCA 1953 as amended. 
If the Bar, through disciplinary proceedings precludes 
his right to practice law, the Bar through its disciplinary 
proceedings thereby interferes with his Constitutional duties 
as Attorney General. To exercise disciplinary sanction beyond 
that of a reprimand is tantamount to impeachment and hence 
by indirection a circumvention of the Utah Constitution and 
unlawful interference with the exclusive constitutional 
provision relating to removal from office. 
. .... 
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The Constitution ancl t11e statutes enlarging the Consti-
tutional duties of the Attorney General impose upon the 
Attorney General duties j ncow3istent with certain of the canoe. 
of ethics enjoined upon m~mbcrs of the Bar. For instance, 
Canon 5 forbids an attorney to represent a party when the 
attorney has a conflict of interest with re~;pccl to another 
party. The Attorney General, by Constitution and statute, 
must represent all of the Utah officers and their agenc.i.es. 
Many times there are confJjcts of interest among Utah agencies 
Is the Attorney General subject to suspension for violating 
this canon? 
If the Bar through its disciplinary proceedings can rerno~ 
the Attorney General, it can through this means deprive the 
people of tneir voice in the selection of a strong and vigoro.~, 
Attorney General. The only two cases that have dealt directly 
with this issue have determined that misconduct of a District 
Attorney when he is elected and subject to constitutional 
removal procedures can be addressed only through impeachment 
proceedings outlined in the State Constitution. Simpson v 
Alabama State Bar, 311 S.2d 307; l'/atson v Alabama, 311 S.2d 31 
For a more elaborate statement of this point, see Appellant's 
Memorandum which is a part of the trial record. 
CONCLUSIOl-J 
In the Dick case, the Bar should have unequivocally made 
findings absolving Appellant from all wrong doing and not 
equivocated in the findings so as to cast et suspicion on tllt 
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propriety of his actions in the matter contained in the count. 
In the Piepenburg count, the Bar should have found him innocent 
of any violation of the canons. In the Emerine and Lowry 
counts the Bar should have found that he maintained complete 
and adequate records, that he was innocent of commingling of 
funds as charged but that he misplaced the records and was not 
thereby able to reasonably make payment of any owed sums upon 
demand or to render a timely accounting. The findings should 
have contained the mitigating circumstances that Appellant had 
recently moved his more than 20 years records from his private 
office to his home, had significantly reduced his clerical 
help because of this change in status, was in the midst of an 
election campaign when the accounting was demanded and had 
precommitted excessive demands on his time, the records needed 
to render the accounting extended over more than 10 years 
each, when he was unable to locate his own records, he exercised 
reasonable efforts to reconstruct the accounting and promptly 
paid all sums owned under the reconstructed accounting. In 
addition, in the Franklin Life-Lowry matters, the findings 
should have completely absolved him on the neglect charge. 
The Legislature has placed on the Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Court has accepted the fact that: 
"\\Te do not consider the recommendations of punishment 
made by the Bar to be in the same category as we do their 
findings of fact, because it is our responsibility to 
discipline an erring attorney, and we cannot de~egate 
that duty to others. The Utah State Bar makes its 
recommendations upon a reading of the printed record of 
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proceedings had before committees and not before the 
individual commissioners of the State Bar. hie arc, 
therefore, in an equally good position to evaluate the 
situation as are the commissioners." In re George 
Bridwell, Disciplinary_Pr_oceeding, 474 P.2d 116. --
In this case, the Bar Commissioners never even had 
before them a transcript of the proceedings but only the con-
clusionary report of the llearing Examiners which they adopted 
in total. We submit a readinu of the record in this case 
does not warrant a suspension from the practice. 
Dated this 17th day of April, 1978. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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